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ABSTRACT
Malaysia continuously negotiates, signs and ratifies international 
treaties to foster closer relationships with its counterparts. The Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia provides no direct provision in granting 
treaty-making capacity to a specific person(s) or institution(s). 
However, it may be deduced from the available provisions that such 
power is exercisable by the executive arm of the Federal Government. 
By definition, the executive includes the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
who is elected among the Malay Rulers by the Conference of Rulers. 
This paper reassesses the roles and functions of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong and the Rulers in the making of international treaties. The 
study was carried out using library based research method which 
assessed the provisions of the Federal Constitution, local case(s) and 
international conventions, in particular the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969. The paper delved into the available legal 
documents to explain the functions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
and the Rulers under the Federal Constitution and accordingly 
reassessed the legal positions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the 
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Rulers in the making of international treaties. The findings of this 
paper showed that in practice, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the 
Rulers have no executive powers to conclude and sign international 
treaties. Nonetheless, the Federal Constitution does confer certain 
limited powers on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Rulers that 
may indirectly influence the making of international treaties where 
their roles are normally consultative in nature.
Keywords: Treaty-making, executive authority, federal constitution, 
international law.
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia pursues international cooperation with members of the 
international communities, which covers both States and international 
organizations. Malaysia became a member of the United Nations 
(UN), an international arena in September 1957, less than one 
month after achieving independence. Besides the UN, Malaysia 
also participated in several other key organizations, including the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC). At the regional level, Malaysia’s commitment 
towards fostering international cooperation is mainly realised 
through its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) since its inception in 1967. In addition, Malaysia 
also establishes bilateral ties with a number of country partners such 
as Pakistan, New Zealand, India, Chile, Australia and Turkey. This 
cooperation is predominantly effected through the conclusion of 
international treaties that spelt out the rights and duties governing 
the relationship between the State-parties.
In the past few years, the Government had made a number of 
controversial decisions with regard to participating in international 
treaties. For instance, on 4 April 2016, the government had joined 
11 other Pacific nations in signing the now discontinued Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (‘TPPA’).1 The TPPA was signed by 
1 Howard, R. (2016, February 4). Pacific rim trade deal signed, but years 
of negotiations still to come. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-
signed-but-years-of-negotiations-still-to-come-idUSKCN0VD08S; 
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the then Minister of International Trade and Industry despite strong 
opposition from different factions within the country. The TPPA 
perceived as harmful to the national, economic and bumiputera 
interests.2 Following this was the unpopular announcement from 
the ruling Pakatan Harapan (‘PH’) government to accede to the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (‘ICERD’).3 The majority of the Malays rejected 
ICERD as it jeopardized the privileges of the Malay Rulers, the 
Malays, the bumiputeras and the religion of Islam as guaranteed in 
the Federal Constitution.4
Conceivably, the most significant turn of events came in March 2019 
when the PH government officially acceded to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 1998 (‘Rome Statute’).5 The decision 




2 Lim, I. (2017, January 31). US’ withdrawal no cause for celebration 
with Malaysia’s anti-TPPA groups. MalayMail. Retrieved from https://
www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2017/01/31/us-withdrawal-
no-cause-for-celebration-with-malaysias-anti-tppa-groups/1303305; 
Bantah TPPA. (2016, January 27). Bantah TPPA’s response to Mustapa’s 
speech. MalaysiaKini. Retrieved from  https://www.malaysiakini.com/
letters/328359.
3	 Minister:	govt	to	ratify	convention	on	racial	discrimination,	five	other	




4 Govt not ratifying ICERD. (2018, November 24). The Star Online. 
Retreived from https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/11/24/
govt-not-ratifying-icerd-we-will-continue-to-defend-federal-
constitution-says-pms-office; Malaysia govt says it won’t ratify UN 
rights treaty after facing anger from malays and muslims. (2018, 
November 23). The Straits Times. Retrieved from https://www.
straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-govt-says-wont-ratify-rights-
treaty-after-facing-anger-from-malays-and-muslims.
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2019, March 4). Malaysia accedes to the 
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had caught the interests of many, including from the royalty. The 
signing of the Rome Statute brought condemnation based on few 
grounds. First, the Rome Statute perceived as encroaching on the 
position of the monarch and the immunity of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong (‘YDPA’). Second, the Government became a subject of 
criticism for acting against the Federal Constitution when they 
acceded to the Rome Statute without consulting the Conference 
of Rulers (COR), whose interests could be jeopardised under the 
treaty.6 Besides, the Foreign Minister had to brief the YDPA on the 
latest status and development following the government’s accession 
to the Rome Statute.7 Relentless pressure ‘forced’ the government 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute in April 2019, slightly one 
month after acceding to the treaty. In announcing the government’s 
decision, Prime Minister Mahathir cited that withdrawal from the 
Rome Statute was to avoid ‘political confusion’ created by certain 
groups of people with personal interests.8
The events following the accession to the Rome Statute raised some 
noteworthy points that require appropriate legal assessment. The 
role of the YDPA and the Rulers, which constitute the COR, in the 
making of international treaties became the centre of attention. This 
is supported by the following facts, namely: a letter was presented 
to the acting YDPA informing His Royal Highness on the Cabinet’s 
decision to accede to the Rome Statute; the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was called to brief the YDPA on the status of Malaysia’s 
6 Malaysia withdraws from the Rome statute. (2019, April 5). The 
Star Online. Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com.my/news/
nation/2019/04/05/malaysia-withdraws-from-the-rome-statute; 
Malaysia withdraws from the Rome statute of the international criminal 
court. (2019, April 5). The Straits Times. Retreived from https://www.
straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-withdraws-from-the-rome-
statute.
7 Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia. (2019, March 13). Kenyataan 
akhbar berhubung menteri luar negeri menghadap KDYMM Seri 




8 Malaysia withdraws from the Rome statute. (2019, April 5); Malaysia 
withdraws from the Rome statute of the international criminal court. 
(2019, April 5).
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participation in the Rome Statute; and the allegation that the COR was 
not consulted prior to the signing of the instrument of accession.
Accordingly, this paper seeks to reassess the position and the role of 
the YDPA and the Rulers in the making of international treaties. The 
study was carried out using library based research method which 
assessed the provisions from the Federal Constitution, local case(s) 
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (‘Vienna 
Convention 1969’), being the main source of international law 
regulating the law of treaties.
The discussion is divided into three main parts. The first part defines 
the meaning and application of treaties in the context of international 
law. The second part explains the position of the institutions of the 
YDPA and the Rulers under the Federal Constitution. The third part 
reassesses the role of the YDPA and the Rulers in the making of 
international treaties with reference to the Vienna Convention 1969, 
the Federal Constitution and supported by decided case(s).
DEFINITION OF TREATIES
Generally, ‘treaty’ refers to a legally binding agreement concluded 
by international personalities, namely States and inter-governmental 
organizations recognized as having treaty-making capacities. 
Oppenheim (1955) described treaties as “agreements, of a contractual 
character, between States, or organizations of States, creating 
legal rights and obligations between the parties.”9 According to 
Schwarzenberger (1949), a treaty means “a consensual engagement 
which subjects of international law have undertaken towards one 
another, with the intent to create legal obligations under international 
law.”10
The legal meaning of treaty can be found in Art. 2(1)(a), Vienna 
Convention 1969, which defines treaty as “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
9 Oppenheim, L. (1955). International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, edited by 
H. Lauterpacht. New York: Congmans, Green.
10 Schwarzenberger, G. (1949). International law as applied by international 
courts and tribunals, vol. 1. Stevens and Sons.
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by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.” The international agreement between States referred 
to above are normally concluded and designated with various names 
including treaty, convention, charter, covenant, statute, agreement, 
pact, protocol, accord, exchange of notes, etc.
Treaties are regarded as the most important documents in international 
law that regulates international relations. This is because a treaty is 
the only means by which States deliberately establish the law for 
themselves. The importance of treaty was clarified by Hamid who 
wrote, “treaty is the most useful instrument through which all kinds 
of international transactions are concluded.”11 He further clarified 
the use of treaties by States to regulate international trade, delineate 
boundaries, resolve conflicts and differences, establish international 
and regional organizations, etc.12 In fact, the multilateral treaties 
that are participated by a substantial number of State parties are 
considered as the best medium for imposing binding and precise 
international rules in various areas of activities.
The essence of treaties as the primary source of international law 
was underlined in the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(‘ICJ Statute’). Art. 38(1)(a) which provides that, “[t]he Court, 
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international 
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting States.” Treaties as a source 
of law may be contextualized under two situations. First, treaties that 
are concluded by a substantial number of States and that stipulate for 
the general rules of international conduct are called ‘law-making 
treaties’ and shall be treated as direct sources of international law. 
Second, treaties that are concluded between two or only a few States 
and that deals with a special matter directly affecting the particular 
States are categorized as ‘treaty-contracts’. This type of treaties is 
similar to contracts concluded at the domestic level and becomes 
the source of legal transactions for the States. In essence, they still 
create binding obligations on the parties thereto, and thus constitute 
particular law for the State-parties.
11 Hamid, A. G. @ Khin Maung Sein. (2019). Public international law: A 
practical approach (4th ed.). Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell.
12 Ibid.
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The obligation for observing a treaty is contained in the doctrine 
of pacta sunt servanda, which means ‘agreements must be kept.’13 
This rule incorporated in Art. 26, Vienna Convention 1969 that 
reads “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” The rationale behind 
this obligation is because States have consented to the terms of the 
treaties and all legal undertakings arising from the same. In other 
words, the State-parties subscribed to the treaties, which in turn 
becomes law governing their relationships. Conversely, a treaty will 
not create obligations on the States that have not consented to the 
terms of the treaty.14
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE YDPA AND THE RULERS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
According to Harding, Malaysia is a unique country, ruled by nine 
monarchies.15 This monarchy system in Malaysia has a long history, 
going back to the foundations of the Kedah Sultanate in 630, followed 
by the Malacca Sultanate in 1262.16 The modern characterization of 
the monarchy was defined in the Federal Constitution that covers two 
institutions, namely the YDPA and the Rulers. The YDPA assumes 
the office of the Head of State at the federal level, while the Rulers 
exercise the function of Heads of State at the state level. As Heads 
of State, the YDPA and the Rulers are normally restricted to perform 
symbolic and ceremonial functions, although they may, in limited 
occasions, exercise activist roles.17
Generally, the Rulers refer to the nine surviving Malay Sultanates 
that have continued to exist after Independence and remained 
13 Garner, B. A. (Ed. in Chief). (2007). Black’s law dictionary (8th Ed.). 
Minnesota: Thomson West.
14 Art. 34, Vienna Convention 1969.
15 Harding, A. (1996). Law, government & the constitution in Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Law Journal Sdn. Bhd. 
16 Ghazali, A. Z. Bin. (2019). “Cabaran Institusi Beraja di Malaysia dari 
Dahulu Hingga Kini” Jabatan Muzium Malaysia, 1–38. Retrieved from 
http://www.jmm.gov.my/files/Cabaran Institusi Beraja di Malaysia dari 
Dahulu Hingga Kini_1.pdf.
17 Bari, A. A. (2003). Malaysian constitution: A critical introduction. 
Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press.
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as such until today. The Rulers assemble in the COR, known as 
Majlis Raja-raja, which is formally constituted under the Federal 
Constitution. The COR elects from among the nine Malay Rulers a 
Ruler to hold the office of the YDPA. The appointment to the office 
of the YDPA is made on a rotation basis and the elected Ruler holds 
office for a term of five years. Unlike the office of the Rulers that 
has survived through history, the office of the YDPA was only set 
up in 1957 under the Federal Constitution. The following discussion 
will briefly explain some key provisions that govern the position 
and roles of the institutions of the YDPA and the Rulers under the 
Federal Constitution.
The YDPA
Art. 32(1), Federal Constitution provides that the YDPA is the 
Supreme Head of the Federation; and he takes precedence over 
all persons within the country. Clause (3) further explains that the 
YDPA is elected by the COR from among the nine Malay Rulers for 
a five-year term. Unless he chooses to resign or is removed from the 
office by the COR, the YDPA ceases to hold office on ceasing to be 
a Ruler.18 Additionally, the YDPA holds the position as the head of 
the religion of Islam in the states of Penang, Malacca, Sabah and 
Sarawak, and the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and 
Putrajaya.19 Art. 153, Federal Constitution places a responsibility on 
the YDPA to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other 
communities.
The YDPA assumes important functions extending to all three State 
organs‒the executive, legislative and judiciary. Art. 39, Federal 
Constitution states that the YDPA is vested with the executive 
authority of the Federation, which shall be exercised by him or by 
the Cabinet or any Minister authorized by the Cabinet. However, in 
the exercise of his functions, Art 40(1), Federal Constitution requires 
the YDPA to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of 
a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet. Clause 
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advice, on advice or after considering advice” as requiring the YDPA 
to accept and act in accordance with such advice. Nonetheless this 
rule does not take away the YDPA’s power to request any information 
from the Cabinet in relation to the Federal Government.20
The executive functions of the YDPA as outlined in the Federal 
Constitution include the following:
to appoint a Prime Minister [Art. 40(2)(a)];(i) 
to withhold consent to a request for dissolving the Parliament (ii) 
[Art. 40(2)(b)];
to request for a meeting of the COR to discuss matters (iii) 
concerning the privileges, position, honour and dignity of the 
Rulers [Art. 40(2)(c)];
to hold the position of the Supreme Commander of the armed (iv) 
forces of the Federation [Art. 41];
to grant pardons, reprieves and respites in respect of all (v) 
offences tried by court-martial and all offences committed 
in the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and 
Putrajaya [Art. 42(1)];
to appoint a (vi) Jemaah Menteri or Cabinet of Ministers, 
consisting of a Prime Minister and the Ministers [Art. 43(1) 
and (2)]; and
to appoint the Deputy Ministers [Art. 43A(1)].(vii) 
The legislative authority of the YDPA is provided for under Art. 
44, Federal Constitution. The YDPA constitutes one of the three 
constituents of the Parliament, alongside the House of Senate 
(Dewan Negara) and the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). 
The Federal Constitution enumerates several functions of the YDPA 
affecting the legislature, which includes:
to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Parliament [Art. 55];(i) 
to address the Houses of Parliament [Art. 60];(ii) 
to appoint the Clerk to both Houses of Parliament [Art. 65(2)]; (iii) 
and
to assent to the Bills passed by the Houses of Parliament [Art. (iv) 
66].
Besides exercising the executive and legislative powers, the YDPA 
also performs several functions relating to the judiciary. Primarily, 
20 Art. 40(1), Federal Constitution.
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the YDPA is responsible for appointing judges to hold the main 
offices of the judiciary.21 They are the Chief Justice of the Federal 
Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Chief Judges of 
the High Courts. Likewise, the YDPA is responsible for appointing 
superior court judges to sit in the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal 
and the High Courts. In appointing the judges referred to above, 
the YDPA is required to act on the Prime Minister’s advice, after 
consulting the COR.22
Additionally, the Federal Constitution empowers the YDPA to 
appoint persons to hold several key offices within the Federation. 
These offices or institutions include the Auditor General [Art. 105], 
the Election Commission [Art. 114(1)]; the Chief of Defence Forces 
[Art. 137(3)(c)]; members of the Public Services Commission [Art. 
139(4)]; and the Attorney General [Art. 145(1)]. The other important 
function of the YDPA is the proclamation of emergency pursuant to 
Art. 150, Federal Constitution.
In short, the YDPA is conferred with an extensive list of powers. 
However, the Federal Constitution restricts the powers by consistently 
directing the YDPA to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, or 
the Ministers or other authorized persons or institutions. This rule 
is embedded in Art. 40(1A), Federal Constitution and is evident in 
several court cases. For instance, the Court of Appeal in the case of 
Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim vs. Public Prosecutor23 pronounced that 
the YDPA is required to act on the Prime Minister’s advice. The 
Court further clarified: “[t]he advice envisaged by art. 40(1A) is the 
direct advice given by the recommender and not advice obtained 
after consultation.”
     
The Rulers
The term ‘Ruler’ is defined in Art. 160, Federal Constitution to 
embrace two groups of persons, namely the Yang di-Pertuan Besar 
(for Negeri Sembilan) and any person exercising the functions of 
the Ruler within the meaning of the respective states’ Constitution 
(i.e. for states other than Negeri Sembilan). According to Art. 70, 
21  Art. 122B(1), Federal Constitution.
22  Ibid.
23 [2000] 2 CLJ 570.
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Federal Constitution, the Rulers take precedence after the YDPA 
and his Consort. However in other occasions, the Rulers will take 
precedence over all other persons; and within his own state, the 
Ruler shall take precedence over the other Rulers.24 Further, Art. 
3(2), Federal Constitution confers on the Rulers the position of the 
Heads of the religion of Islam in their own respective states, which 
are exercisable in accordance with the states’ Constitution.
By and large, the provisions regulating the Rulers are spelt out in 
the constitutions of each state.25 Nevertheless, the Eighth Schedule 
to the Federal Constitution regulates certain important provisions 
concerning the Rulers. Section 1(2), Eighth Schedule provides 
that the Ruler has discretionary powers to perform the following 
functions:
to appoint a (i) Menteri Besar (i.e. Chief Minister);
to withhold consent to a request for dissolving the state’s (ii) 
Legislative Assembly;
to request the COR for a meeting to discuss issues (iii) 
concerning the privileges, position, honour and dignity of the 
Rulers or religious matters;
to perform the function as Head of the religion of Islam or (iv) 
relating to the Malay customs;
to appoint an heir or heirs, consort, Regent or Council of (v) 
Regency;
to award titles, honours and dignities; and (vi) 
to regulate royal courts and palaces.(vii) 
Additionally, the Eighth Schedule confers other crucial powers 
on the Ruler to perform within its own respective state. The Ruler 
shall, inter alia, appoint an Executive Council [sec. 2(1) and (2)]; 
constitute the state’s Legislature alongside the Legislative Assembly 
[sec. 3]; summon, prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly 
[sec. 9]; and assent to the Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly 
[sec. 11(1)].
24 Art. 70, Federal Constitution.
25 See for instance, Art. 71(1), Federal Constitution: Any reference as to 
the right of a Ruler of a State to succeed and to hold, enjoy and exercise 
his constitutional rights and privileges, and the manner for determining 
any dispute as to the title to the succession as a Ruler of any State shall 
only be made to the Constitution of the respective state.
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Except where the Ruler is granted with discretionary powers, the 
Federal Constitution requires the Ruler to act in accordance with 
the advice of the Executive Council or of a member thereof acting 
under the general authority of the Council.26 As in the case of the 
YDPA, sec. 1(1A), Eighth Schedule requires the Ruler when acting 
‘in accordance with advice or on advice’, to accept and act in 
accordance with such advice.
The unique feature of the Rulers is underlined in Art. 38(1), Federal 
Constitution, where they shall assemble in the Majlis Raja-Raja or 
the COR. The provisions regulating the COR are detailed out in the 
Fifth Schedule. According to sec. 1, the COR consists of the Malay 
Rulers and the Yang di-Pertua-Yang di-Pertua Negeri (i.e. for states 
without a Ruler). However, sec. 7 limits the rights of the Yang di-
Pertua-Yang di-Pertua Negeri to partake in any proceedings of the 
COR when the meeting is convened to discuss issues concerning 
the election or removal of the YDPA or his Deputy, the privileges, 
position, honour and dignity of the Malay Rulers, or the religious 
acts, observances or ceremonies.
The functions of the COR are provided for in Art. 38, Federal 
Constitution, which include:
to elect the YDPA and the Deputy YDPA in accordance with (i) 
the Third Schedule Federal Constitution;
to agree or disagree to the extension of any religious acts, (ii) 
observances or ceremonies to the whole country;
to consent or withhold consent to any law and to make or give (iii) 
advice on any appointment in accordance with the Federal 
Constitution;
to appoint members of the Special Court under Art. 182(1);(iv) 
to grant pardons, reprieves and respites, or to remit, suspend (v) 
or commute sentences, under Art. 42(12);
to deliberate questions of national policy;(vi) 
to consent or withhold consent on the passing of any law (vii) 
directly affecting the privileges, position, honour or dignity 
of the Rulers; and
to be consulted before any change in policy affecting (viii) 
administrative action under Article 153 is made.
26	 Sec.	1(1),	Eighth	Schedule,	Federal	Constitution.
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In many respects, the laws regulating the functions of the Rulers 
are similar to that of the YDPA. The powers of the Rulers are 
mainly limited to their respective states; and in the exercise of their 
functions within the given state, the Rulers are generally required to 
act on the advice of the Executive Councils or any members of the 
Councils. Collectively, the Rulers who assemble in the COR assumes 
a more direct role and functions within the Federation. Primarily, the 
COR is responsible for electing the YDPA. Other than that, as the 
determined by the Federal Constitution, the COR assumes powers to 
give or withhold consent to certain laws and serves as an important 
institution that must be consulted before any appointment to certain 
key offices within the Federation could be made.
REASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE YDPA 
AND THE RULERS IN THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
International treaties, being the primary source of international 
law, are essentially a subject-matter of international law. The rules 
regulating the formation and making of international treaties exist 
in international customs as well as several international treaties. 
The main treaty regulating this area is the Vienna Convention 1969, 
which is also participated by Malaysia.27 Nonetheless, to understand 
treaties by relying exclusively on the provisions of the international 
law may not be sufficient. In other words, reference must also be 
made to the local laws. Moreover, the Vienna Convention 1969 
acknowledges the importance of the local laws in determining the 
legality of treaties signed for the State.28 In Malaysia, the Federal 
Constitution also inculcates certain provisions dealing with 
international treaties. The following discussion will examine some 
important rules in the making of international treaties as provided 
for under the Vienna Convention 1969, the Federal Constitution and 
decided case. Subsequently, the discussion will reassess the roles and 
functions of the YDPA and the Rulers in the making of international 
treaties based on the available authorities.
27	 Malaysia	acceded	to	the	Vienna	Convention	1969	and	became	a	party	
to	the	same	on	27	July	1994.
28 See for instance, Art. 46, Vienna Convention 1969.
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Treaty-Making under the Vienna Convention 1969
Art. 6, Vienna Convention 1969 grants the rights on every sovereign 
State to conclude international treaties. The making of treaties 
symbolizes States’ independence and sovereignty. This is in line 
with Art. 1, Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 
(‘Montevideo Convention’), which underlines the legal criteria of 
statehood, namely a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with the other 
States. The latter implies the rights of a sovereign State to conclude 
international treaties with its counterparts.
The State’s representative for the purpose of adopting or authenticating 
the text of a treaty or for expressing the consent of the State to be 
bound by a treaty is explained in Art. 7, Vienna Convention 1969. 
Paragraph (1)(a) lays down the general rule that requires the person 
representing a State to tender appropriate full powers indicating 
his authority to adopt, authenticate or express consent to the treaty. 
However, such requirement may be dispensed with if it can be inferred 
from the State’s practice that the State intends to acknowledge the 
person as its representative for the purpose mentioned above.29
In addition, the Vienna Convention 1969 expressly recognizes three 
groups of persons who, by reason of their functions, are considered 
as representing their States, and are excluded from producing 
appropriate full powers. Art. 7(2) categorizes these persons into 
three groups, namely (a) the Heads of State, Heads of Government 
and Ministers for Foreign Affairs; (b) heads of diplomatic missions; 
and (c) the representatives accredited by States to an international 
conference or to an international organization. The exclusion from 
producing full appropriate powers granted to the first group of 
persons extends to all necessary acts for concluding treaties. The 
same exemption is granted to the second and third group of persons 
but only for the purpose of adopting the text of treaties within their 
respective missions.
The effect of a treaty concluded by a person not having the appropriate 
authority to represent a State is further explained in Art. 8, Vienna 
 
29 Art. 7(1)(b), Vienna Convention 1969.
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Convention 1969. In principle, such treaty carries no legal effect on 
the respective State, unless the State decides to affirm it.
Treaty-Making under the Federal Constitution
The starting point for discussing the treaty-making power in Malaysia 
must begin by drawing references to Arts. 74, 76 and the Ninth 
Schedule of the Federal Constitution. Art. 74(1) reads: “Parliament 
may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the 
Federal List or the Concurrent List (that is to say, the First or Third 
List set out in the Ninth Schedule).” A cross reference to section 1 
of List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule shows the ‘external 
affairs’ as one of the areas falling under the legislative lists of the 
Parliament. The subject-matters included in the external affairs are, 
inter alia, treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries 
and the implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with 
other countries.30 Meanwhile, Art. 76(1)(a) confers on the Parliament 
the extended powers to make laws for all constituent states in 
Malaysia for the purpose of implementing any treaty, agreement or 
convention between Malaysia and any other country, or any decision 
of an international organization of which Malaysia is a member.
Two points may be deduced from the above provisions. Firstly, the 
Federal Constitution expressly confers on the Federal Parliament, 
vis-à-vis the Legislative Assembly of the constituent states, the sole 
power to legislate on treaties. Secondly, the wordings used in Arts. 
74(1) and 76(1)(a) restrict the Parliament’s power to enact laws on 
international treaties, i.e. a legislative function.31 In other words, the 
power of the Parliament does not extend to executing or concluding 
the treaties.
Unlike the Parliament which is delimited to exercise the legislative 
functions, the Federal Constitution does not expressly describe the 
30 See further section 1, List 1 (Federal List), Ninth Schedule, Federal 
Constitution.
31 See, especially, Art. 73(a), Federal Constitution: “In 
exercising the legislative powers conferred on it by this 
Constitution—(a) parliament may make laws for the whole or any part 
of the Federation and laws having effect outside as well as within the 
Federation”.
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scope of the executive authority. Art. 80(1), Federal Constitution 
reads: “[…] the executive authority of the Federation extends to all 
matters with respect to which Parliament may make laws […].” This 
provision confers on the executive body (at the Federal level) the right 
to exercise legal powers on the subject-matters listed in the Federal 
List and the Concurrent List to the Ninth Schedule. As stated earlier, 
they include the external affairs, covering treaties, agreements and 
conventions with other countries and the implementation of those 
treaties, agreements and conventions. 
In explaining the nature and scope of the executive authority, Bari, 
for instance, stated that the executive powers are far-reaching and 
cover “the residue of governmental function that remains after 
legislative and judicial functions are taken away”.32 For examples, 
the executive may legally exercise power to implement national 
policies, maintain peace and security, supervise the civil service and 
determine foreign policies.33 Accordingly, it can be established that 
the executive organ at the Federal level (i.e. Government of the day) 
assumes the effective powers to execute and conclude international 
treaties.
The manners for exercising the executive authority is further 
explained in Arts. 39 and 40, Federal Constitution. Art. 39 provides 
that the executive authority of the Federation shall be vested in the 
YDPA and exercisable by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister 
authorized by the Cabinet. However, Art. 40(1) and (1A) requires 
the YDPA, in the exercise of the executive functions, to accept and 
act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister 
acting under the general authority of the Cabinet.
32  Bari (2003); See also in Basu, D. Das. (1999). Introduction to the 
constitution of India (18th ed.). Nagpur: Wadhwa and Company; 
Johari, J. C. (2007). The constitution of India: A politico-legal study 
(4th ed.). New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited; Somanathan, 
T. V. (2016). The administrative and regulatory state. In S. Choudhry, 
M. Khosla, & P. B. Mehta (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the Indian 
constitution (pp. 386–411). Oxford: Oxford University Press. This 
definition of the ‘executive authority’ was enunciated by Mukherjea CJ 
in the Indian case of Ram Jawaya Kapur vs. State of Punjab (1955) AIR 
549 (Supreme Court).
33 Bari (2003).
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The Case of Government of the State of Kelantan vs. the Government 
of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-
Haj.34
On 10 September 1963, just six days before the historic formation 
of Malaysia, the Government of the State of Kelantan instituted 
an action against the Federal Government for declarations that 
the Malaysia Agreement 1963 and the Malaysia Act were null and 
void, or alternatively were not binding on the State of Kelantan. 
The Malaysia Agreement 1963 was signed in July 1963 between 
the Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the United Kingdom, 
Sarawak, North Borneo and Singapore. The Agreement would 
bring Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak to federate with the existing 
eleven states of the Federation of Malaya (including the State of 
Kelantan) to form the Federation of Malaysia. The Malaysia Act 
was subsequently passed by the Federal Government to amend the 
Federal Constitution and gives domestic legal effect to the Malaysia 
Agreement 1963.
The State of Kelantan challenged the legality of the Malaysia 
Agreement 1963 and the Malaysia Act on the following grounds:
the Malaysia Act would violate the Federation of Malaya (i) 
Agreement 1957 by abolishing the ‘Federation of Malaya’;
the proposed changes needed the consent of each constituent (ii) 
state including the State of Kelantan, and this had not been 
obtained;
the Sultan of Kelantan should have been made a party to the (iii) 
Malaysia Agreement 1963;
the constitutional convention dictates that consultation with (iv) 
the Rulers of individual states was required before substantial 
changes can be made to the Constitution; and
the Federal Parliament had no power to legislate for the State (v) 
of Kelantan in matters that the state could legislate on its 
own.
Thompson CJ who presided over the proceedings, rejected the claim 
by the State of Kelantan. In delivering his judgment, the judge 
pronounced, inter alia:
34 [1963] MLJ 355 (High Court).
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“The Malaysia Agreement is signed ‘for the Federation 
of Malaya’ by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and four other members of the Cabinet. This 
was in compliance with Articles 39 and 80(1) of the 
Constitution and there is nothing whatsoever in the 
Constitution requiring consultation with any State 
Government or the Ruler of any State.”
Accordingly, the Court in the above landmark case acknowledged 
the authority of the Cabinet members (being the executive arm of 
the Federal Government) to sign a treaty without the need to conduct 
prior consultation with the Rulers.
Reassessing the Roles of the YDPA and the Rulers in the 
Making of International Treaties
The explanation on the legal provisions referred to above provides 
some basic ideas and structures in reassessing the roles of the YDPA 
and the Rulers in making international treaties.
Generally, the Federal Constitution provides no clear provisions 
on granting treaty-making capacity to the YDPA. As previously 
discussed, the functions conferred on the YDPA extends to the 
executive, legislative and judicial tasks; but for the majority parts, 
the YDPA is required to exercise his functions by observing the 
advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet of Ministers. Likewise, 
the Rulers at the state level must also act according to the advice 
of each respective Executive Council. The Federal Constitution 
also regulates for the COR, which constitutes the Malay Rulers. In 
principle, the COR does not occupy the extensive functions like the 
YDPA. In many respects, the roles of the COR are consultative in 
nature and its functions are mostly restricted to matters affecting the 
Malays, the Rulers and the religion of Islam.
However, the power of the Monarchs to conclude treaties is not new 
and unusual. Historically, the Royals, especially the Malay Rulers, 
performed the ultimate role in executing treaties with foreign 
sovereigns. This is evident from the large number of old treaties and 
documents executed by the Malay Rulers. For instances:35
35  See Institute Terjemahan Negara Malaysia Berhad. (2008). Perjanjian 
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His Highness Sultan Hussain Mahomed Shah (Sultan of (i) 
Johore) signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with the East 
India Company in 1824;
Their Highnesses Sultan Idris (Sultan of Perak), Sultan (ii) 
Abdul Samad (Sultan of Selangor), Sultan Ahmad (Sultan of 
Pahang), Tuanku Muhammad ibni Tuanku Antah (Yam Tuan 
Besar of Sri Menanti) signed the Treaty of Federation 1895 
with the Governor of the Straits Settlements (acting on behalf 
of Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India);
His Highness Tungku Long Senik (Raja of Kelantan), on (iii) 
behalf of the Government of Kelantan, signed an agreement 
with the Government of Great Britain (represented by His 
Excellency the High Commissioner for the Protected Malay 
States) in 1910;
His Highness Syed Putra Jamahillil (Raja of Perlis) signed an (iv) 
agreement with His Majesty’s Government within the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (represented 
by Harold MacMichael) in 1945; and
Eight Malay Rulers (Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, (v) 
Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perak), the Regent 
of Johore (who was representing the Sultan of Johore), the 
Ruling Chiefs of Negeri Sembilan and Sir Donald Charles 
MacGillivray (on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen) signed 
and concluded the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1957.
Following the Independence in 1957 and the coming into force 
of the Federal Constitution, a few rules were incorporated (either 
directly or indirectly), which has affected the power of the Monarchs 
to make treaties. The Monarchs, namely the YDPA and the Rulers, 
are restricted to act within the limits permitted by the Federal 
Constitution and each respective state’s Constitution, as the case 
may be.
In principle, the Rulers are not qualified to conclude a treaty on 
behalf of the State under both the Federal Constitution and the 
international law. At the international level, the Vienna Convention 
1969 recognizes the capacity of every sovereign State to conclude 
& dokumen lama Malaysia 1791 - 1965; Old treaties & documents 
of Malaysia 1791 - 1965. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Terjemahan Negara 
Malaysia Berhad.
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treaties.36 What constitutes a ‘State’ were not stated in the Convention. 
The criteria of statehood under international law was defined under 
Art. 1, Montevideo Convention. An entity is qualified as a ‘State’ if it 
is able to conduct its own external affairs. In the context of Malaysia, 
the Governments at the state level do not meet this criterion. This 
is because, by virtue of Art. 74(1) and List I (Federal List) of the 
Ninth Schedule, the Federal Constitution places the subject-matter 
of external affairs (including treaties) under the purview of the 
legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government. In 
other words, the Federal Constitution only empowers the Federal 
Government, as opposed to the constituent state Governments, to 
deal with the international agreements. It follows that the Rulers 
as Heads of State at the state level, albeit exercising the executive 
functions, are evidently not conferred with the power to conclude 
international treaties. The Rulers are excluded from the meaning of 
‘State’ in the eyes of international law.
However, the above inference does not apply to the YDPA. Unlike the 
Rulers, the YDPA exercises functions at the Federal level. He is the 
Supreme Head of the Federation [Art. 32(1)] and part of the executive 
branch of the Federal Government [Art. 39]. The international law 
recognizes the YDPA’s authority as the representative of a State for 
concluding international treaties, even without the need of providing 
full appropriate powers. This is in Art. 7(2)(a), Vienna Convention 
1969 which recognizes the Head of the State, Head of the Government 
and the Minister for Foreign Affairs as legal representatives of the 
States in carrying all necessary acts for concluding treaties. In the 
context of Malaysia, the Head of State refers to the YDPA as the 
Supreme Head of the Federation (Art. 32(1), Federal Constitution), 
the Head of the Government refers to the Prime Minister that presides 
over the Cabinet of Ministers (Art. 43(2)(a), Federal Constitution) and 
the Foreign Minister being a member of the Cabinet (Art 43(1) and 
(2)(b), Federal Constitution). Collectively, they form the executive 
branch of the Federal Government in pursuant to Art. 39, Federal 
Constitution. By literal reading of Art. 7, Vienna Convention 1969 
and Art. 39, Federal Constitution, the YDPA may be said to possess 
the appropriate power to sign international treaty.
Essentially, the Cabinet, which is formed on the basis of party 
politics, exercises the effective executive power.37 The Cabinet is 
36 Art. 6, Vienna Convention 1969.
37 Ahmad, S. S. S. (2007). Malaysian legal system (2nd ed.). Kelana 
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constituted of Ministers, collectively known as the Jemaah Menteri 
(Cabinet of Ministers) and is headed by a Prime Minister appointed 
by the YDPA.38 In practice, the YDPA does not possess the power 
to conclude international treaties, rather they are entered into for the 
Government of Malaysia by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister 
and such other authorized Ministers. This conclusion is derived 
from the reading of Arts. 39 and 40(1) and (1A) of the Federal 
Constitution discussed earlier. Bari’s observation also supports the 
above conclusion. He reiterated that although the executive authority 
is vested on the Heads of State (i.e. the YDPA and the Rulers), but 
the constitutional democracy requires that the right to rule or make 
important decisions be given to the Government of the day (i.e. 
the Cabinet).39 As the popularly elected government, the Cabinet is 
responsible for the country’s administration and shall be accountable 
to the people.40 Meanwhile, the YDPA and the Rulers perform a 
formal role as a symbol of unity and authority and are required to 
act on the advice of the Cabinet or the Executive Councils.41
Although the YDPA has no authority to make a treaty, a careful 
examination of the Federal Constitution shows few avenues where 
the YDPA or the Rulers (including the COR) may exercise functions 
in the country’s administration. The exercise of these functions may 
include influencing the making of international treaties.
Firstly, Art. 38(2), Federal Constitution authorizes the COR to discuss 
and consider matters relating to the national policies or on any other 
issues as the COR thinks fit. The Federal Constitution allows for 
the deliberation on matters concerning the national policy to be 
made in the presence of the YDPA and the Rulers. However, clause 
(3) places certain restrictions on the COR in exercising this right. 
Technically, the YDPA is required to be accompanied by the Prime 
Minister, while the Rulers and the Yang di-Pertua-Yang di-Pertua 
Jaya: LexisNexis; Yatim, R. (1995). Freedom under executive power in 
Malaysia: A study of executive supremacy. Kuala Lumpur: Endowment, 
p. 28: The real executive power vests in the Prime Minister who heads 
the Cabinet.
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Negeri shall be accompanied by their respective Chief Ministers. 
In terms of the substance of the meeting, the deliberation shall be 
among the functions exercised by the YDPA (acting on the advice of 
the Cabinet) and the Rulers and the Yang di-Pertua-Yang di-Pertua 
Negeri (acting in accordance with the advice of their respective 
Executive Councils).
Secondly, the Federal Constitution allows the YDPA to be updated 
on the administrative affairs of the country. Art. 40(1) states that the 
YDPA, while carrying out the executive functions, “shall be entitled, 
at his request, to any information concerning the Government of the 
Federation which is available to the Cabinet.” This occasion may 
serve as a platform for the YDPA to inquire about updates on the 
country’s administration and to voice his views and give advice on 
the same. The topics could be anything, including matters relating to 
the conclusion of treaties.
Thirdly, the Federal Constitution makes several references to the 
requirement of conducting consultation with or obtaining consent 
from relevant state Governments or the COR (as the case may be) 
before any decision could be made or any law could be enacted. This 
reference imposes certain functions on the Rulers‒being part of the 
state Governments and members of the COR‒to influence decisions 
made by the Federal Government, including matters relating to 
international treaties.
In light of the present discussion, the reference to Art. 38, Federal 
Constitution is central in explaining the scope and functions of the 
COR, which is composed of the Malay Rulers. As stated earlier, Art. 
38(2)(c) confers on the COR the right to give or withhold consent 
to the making of any law as determined by the Federal Constitution. 
Clause (4) further qualifies that the consent of the COR must be 
obtained when the law to be passed directly affects the privileges, 
position, honour or dignity of the Rulers.42
Albeit the provision conferring on the COR the power to agree 
on a proposed law, its application is limited and does not extend 
42 See also Art. 38(6)(c), Federal Constitution: In the exercise of his 
functions in any proceedings of the COR, a Ruler may act on his own 
discretion when giving or withholding consent to any law affecting the 
privileges, position, honour or dignity of the Rulers.
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to the right of giving or withholding consent to make international 
treaties. The consent of the COR shall only be obtained if the law 
to be introduced has domestic legal effect. Conversely, the signing 
of international treaties introduces particular law at the international 
level. International treaties are not a direct source of local law, 
rather they are part of international law,43 where it creates rights and 
obligations on the State-parties in their international relationship.44 
In the context of Malaysia, the meaning of ‘law’ is defined in Art. 
160, Federal Constitution to include written law, the common law 
which is legally operative in Malaysia and any custom or usage 
having the force of law in Malaysia. The written law consists of the 
Federal Constitution and the State Constitutions, legislation enacted 
by the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies, subsidiary 
legislation made by the authorized persons or bodies and emergency 
Ordinances made by the YDPA.45 It follows that, international 
treaties are excluded from the meaning of ‘law’ under the purview 
of Art. 38, Federal Constitution.
This position reflects the practice of Malaysia which leans towards 
the dualistic approach by treating international treaties as separated 
from the national legal system.46 An international treaty has no 
domestic legal force unless it is expressly transformed (i.e. adopted) 
as part of the national law. The doctrine of transformation dictates 
that an act of transformation via express means of local legislation 
or an Act of Parliament, known as the enabling Act, is needed to 
transform treaties into the local laws.47 By referring to Art. 38(2)
(c) and (4), Federal Constitution, it is only at this stage, i.e. when 
43 Art. 38(1), ICJ Statute: “The Court [International Court of Justice], 
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establish rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states; (b) …”
44 Art. 26, Vienna Convention 1969 incorporates the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda and imposes an obligation on all State-parties to perform 
every treaty in force in good faith.
45 Aun, W. M. (2005). The Malaysian legal system (3rd ed.). Petaling 
Jaya: Pearson Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., pp. 109-121; Pheng, L. M. (2005). 
General principles of Malaysian law (5th ed.). Shah Alam: Penerbit 
Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., pp. 17-41.
46 Hamid (2019).
47 Shaw, M. N. (2014). International law (7th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University	Press,	p.	100.
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the Parliament wants to introduce a treaty locally, that the consent 
from the COR must be obtained if the enacted provisions of the 
treaty directly affects the privileges, position, honour or dignity 
of the Rulers. Otherwise, consent of the COR is not required to be 
obtained if the situation falls outside the scope of Art. 38, Federal 
Constitution.
The other crucial provision is Art. 76, Federal Constitution which 
explains the scope of consultation with the state Government. 
Generally, Art. 76(1)(a) permits the Parliament to make laws 
falling under the State List of the Ninth Schedule for the purpose 
of implementing any treaty, agreement or convention between the 
Federation and any other country. Clause (2) limits such power 
by imposing a mandatory requirement for the state Government 
concerned to be consulted if the proposed law deals with the Islamic 
law or the Malay customs. In this context, the Ruler as the Head of 
State must be consulted, especially when he assumes the position of 
the Head of the religion of Islam and the Malay customs in his own 
state.48
However, this provision must be viewed with limitation. This is 
because the requirement for consulting the state Government shall 
only take effect when the Federal Government decides to introduce 
international treaties locally, and not at the time when the Federal 
Government signs international treaties. Besides, Art. 76 merely 
imposes the requirement of conducting consultation, vis-à-vis 
obtaining consent from, the state Government. On this point, Jewa 
notes that the requirement for ‘consultation’ does not in any way 
implies ‘consent’.49 As such, even if the Federal Government is 
required to consult the state Government, the former is not bound 
to follow the views expressed in the course of such consultation.50 
Moreover, the consultation with the state Government only becomes 
mandatory when it is required under the Federal Constitution. On 
the contrary, where the Federal Constitution makes no reference 
to the need of conducting consultation, no such obligation for 
48 See further Art. 3(2) and Section 1(2)(d), Eighth Schedule, Federal 
Constitution.
49 Jewa, T. S. (1996). Public international law: A Malaysian perspective 
(Volume I). Kuala Lumpur: Pacifica Publications.
50 Ibid.
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conducting consultation may be implied.51 This observation further 
weakens the impact of Art. 76, Federal Constitution, in so far as the 
consultation with the state Government (which includes the Rulers) 
is concerned.
At the international level, the importance of the consultation process 
in the making of international treaties can be summarised from just 
a few contexts. For example, the significance of consultation is 
implied from the practice of ratification. Art. 14, Vienna Convention 
1969 recognizes ratification as one of the legal means for expressing 
consent to be bound by treaties.52 Hamid stated that ratification 
provides an opportunity for the contracting States to self-reflect 
by re-examining all ensuing effects and benefits of the treaty.53 
Likewise, the process allows the Government appropriate space and 
time for carrying out consultations with interested persons or groups 
concerning the obligation that the State is about to undertake.54 
Therefore, if a treaty is signed subject to ratification, those parties 
who are required to be consulted, may use the platform to offer views 
and advice to the Government before any further act of ratifying a 
treaty is completed.
In other instance, a State’s domestic law may require consultation 
with relevant institutions as precondition before the Government 
signs an international treaty. If this is the requirement, then, failure 
to conduct the necessary consultation may be a valid ground to 
invalidate the concluded treaty. This inference is derived from Art. 
46(1), Vienna Convention 1969. The provision reads: “[a] State may 
not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless 
that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law 
of fundamental importance.” In this context, Art. 46(1) allows a 
state to avoid a treaty concluded on its behalf on the pretext that the 
treaty was made in clear breach of the required internal procedures 
51 Ibid.
52 See further Art. 2(1)(b), Vienna Convention 1969: ratification means 
“the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the 
international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty”.
53 Hamid (2019).
54 Ibid.
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of a state’s domestic laws. These domestic procedures may include 
conducting consultation with the relevant institution or organs. 
The grounds allowed for invalidating treaties for failure to observe 
States’ internal consultative procedures may be illustrated in several 
cases. Before the entry into force of the Vienna Convention 1969, 
the Senate of the United States challenged the validity of the 
1975 bilateral agreement between the United States and Israel in 
connection with the latter’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.55 
Under the said agreement, the United States committed to aid Israel 
in fulfilling their supply needs and defense requirements. The Senate 
alleged that the agreement had no force of law, both at the domestic 
and international levels. It was because the Government concluded 
the agreement bypassing the advice and consent of the Senate, which 
were crucial procedures under the State’s constitution.56 However, 
the Senate’s contention was met with rejection by the Department of 
the State, to which the former did not take further action.57 In 1990, 
Iraq challenged the presumed boundary between her and Kuwait 
as established in the 1963 bilateral agreement.58 The validity of the 
said agreement was questioned by Iraq on the grounds that, inter 
alia, the Government’s agreement was made in the absence of the 
Iraqi Parliament’s approval. However, the allegation by Iraq was 
subsequently rejected.59
55 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 112 Israel-United States Memorandum 
of Understanding- 1 September 1975. Retrieved from https://mfa.gov.
il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook2/pages/112%20israel-
united%20states%20memorandum%20of%20understandi.aspx.
56 Art. II, s. 2, the United States Constitution grants the power on the 
President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Unless the Senate (i.e. two-thirds of the Senators present) has given its 
advice and consent to such treaty, the treaty is not valid on the United 
States. 
57 Meron, T. (1978). Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Ultra Vires Treaties): Some Recent Cases. British Yearbook 
of International Law, 49(1). 175-199.
58  The agreement entitled the Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration 
of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, signed on 4 
October 1963 (Baghdad, Iraq), Serial No. 485 UNTS 321.
59  See further Mendelson, M.H. and Hulton, S.C. (1990). The Iraq-Kuwait 
boundary: Legal aspects. Rev. BDI, 23 293.
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In the context of Malaysia, there is no such provision in the Federal 
Constitution (including Art. 76) which requires prior consultation 
with the Rulers or the COR before the Federal Government 
decides to sign or ratify a treaty. In the absence of such provision, 
an international treaty may be validly signed and concluded even 
without prior consultation with the Rulers or the COR. This was 
the established position as decided by the court in the landmark 
case of Government of the State of Kelantan v. the Government 
of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-
Haj discussed earlier. In accordance therefore Article 46(1), of the 
Vienna Convention 1969 failed to invalidate a treaty by reason that 
the consultation process with the interested parties (which included 
the Rulers) was not evident.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, the monarchy is an important institution in Malaysia. 
The monarchs are the focus or symbol of identity in the country.60 
At the same time, the Federal Constitution grants crucial powers 
on the YDPA, the Rulers and the COR affecting the country’s 
administration. Nonetheless, these powers are within the limits and 
scope as determined by the Federal Constitution. For most of the 
time, the YDPA is required to act in accordance with the advice of 
the Prime Minister or the Cabinet of Ministers. Likewise, the Rulers 
are required to act on the advice of the state’s Executive Council or 
of a member thereof. On this premise, scholars such as Bari, is of 
the view that the YDPA and the Rulers normally perform symbolic 
and ceremonial functions.61 In other words, the Monarchs usually 
do not interfere in the country’s day-to-day administration, unless 
in the manner authorized by the Federal Constitution or the state’s 
Constitution as the case may be.
In the context of treaty-making, the YDPA and the Rulers have no 
legal capacity to make and conclude international treaties. Although 
this is the position practised in Malaysia, the YDPA and the Rulers 
can still influence the making of international treaties. The YDPA and 
the Rulers (which also cover the COR) may offer their viewpoints, 
60 Harding (1996), p. 62.
61 Bari (2003).
UUMJLS 11(2), July 2020 (117-152)
144
feedback and advice to the Cabinet concerning a proposed treaty. 
This function may appear insignificant, but they do have a basis in 
several legal provisions and may carry certain weight. Simply put, 
negating entirely the roles of the YDPA and the Rulers in the making 
of treaties may not be appropriate because international treaties do 
not merely operate at international level, but they may still regulate 
the domestic affairs that interfere with the position, function and role 
of the YDPA and the Rulers.
The extent to which the YDPA and the Rulers may persuade the 
making of international treaties is rather difficult to measure precisely. 
Moreover, the Federal Constitution merely requires the YDPA (or 
the Rulers) to accept the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers (or the 
Executive Council), and not the other way around. Notwithstanding 
the above, the influence of the YDPA and the Rulers in the country’s 
administration in general is exigent. In particular, the Federal 
Constitution places the YDPA and the Rulers as taking precedence 
over all persons in Malaysia, including the Prime Minister, Chief 
Ministers, Ministers and members of the states’ Executive Council. 
Although the above reference is merely restricted to the priority and 
position of the YDPA and the Rulers, as opposed to their views and 
opinions, there is always a feeling of deference, approval and liking 
among Malaysians towards the ideas, suggestions and viewpoints 
of the Monarchy because of their status in society. To put it in a 
different context, the views and opinions of the YDPA or the Rulers 
on matters relating to the country’s administration may produce a 
sentiment of respect among the administrators or the Government 
of the day, which shall be recognized as important and be given 
due consideration before any administrative action can be taken. 
Logically, if the highest-ranked person in the country asks for 
something done, would one normally oppose?
In the past, there have been a number of instances where the YDPA and 
the Rulers were ‘called’ to intervene in the country’s administration. 
For example, former Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir led the ‘Save 
Malaysia’ movement demanding the interference from the YDPA 
and the COR to remove the then Prime Minister Najib Razak from 
his office following the 1MDB scandal.62 The petition called ‘the 
62 Tan, C.K. (2016, March 28). Mahathir calls for submitting 1M 
signatures to oust Najib. Nikkei Asian Review. Retrieved from https://
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Mahathir-calls-for-submitting-1m-signatures-
to-oust-Najib; Wahari, H. and Zul, S. A. (2016, September 15). 
Malaysia’s king, Mahathir hold rare talks over petition seeking PM 
Najib’s removal. Benar News. Retrieved from https://www.benarnews.
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Citizen’s Declaration’ was handed over to the then YDPA during a 
closed meeting at Istana Anak Bukit, Alor Setar in September 2016. 
However, it was reported that the King refused to get involved in 
removing Prime Minister Najib via the petition, claiming that the 
removal of the Prime Minister can only be done within the ambit of 
the Federal Constitution.63
Similar situations could have come from the state level. The Rulers 
have on numerous occasions, exerted their authority in appointing 
the Chief Ministers although these decisions seemed to be against 
the will of the political parties. One of the noteworthy incidents took 
place in Selangor when the Sultan of Selangor finally decided to 
appoint Azmin Ali over Wan Azizah as the new Chief Minister in 
2014 following the resignation of Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim.64 In Perlis, 
the conflict occurred when the King of Perlis re-appointed Datuk Seri 
Azlan Man as the Chief Minister following the 14th General Election 
to the displeasure of the Perlis Barisan Nasional leadership.65 The 
recent crisis in the appointment of the Chief Minister took place in 
Johor in April 2019 when Prime Minister Mahathir and the Ruler 
of Johor both exerted their authority in having the final say over the 
appointment and removal of the Chief Minister.66 The episode saw 
org/english/news/malaysian/mahathir-meeting-09152016203927.
html; Tan, J. (2016, September 25). Dr. M’s audience with the king. 




63 Wahari and Zul (2016, September 15); Tan (2016, September 25).
64 Osman, M. N. M., Sun, O. E., Pasuni, A., & People’s Justice Party, 
P. K. R. (2014). The Selangor Chief Minister Crisis and the Future of 
Pakatan Rakyat (PR). Malaysia Update.
65 Loh, A. and Chern, L.T. (2018, May 24). Azlan Man sworn in as 
Perlis MB for second term. The Star Online. Retrieved from https://
www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2018/05/24/azlan-man-sworn-
in-as-perlis-mb-for-second-term; Crisis in Perlis resolved as all BN 
assemblymen now backs Menteri Besar. (2018, June 5). The Straits 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/crisis-
in-perlis-resolved-as-all-bn-assemblyman-now-backs-menteri-besar. 
66 Maria. A. (2019, April 11). Bitter feud between Dr Mahathir and the 
Johor royal family rages on. The Independent. Retrieved from http://
theindependent.sg/bitter-feud-between-dr-mahathir-and-the-johor-
royal-family-rages-on/; Malaysia swears in new Chief Minister of state 
of Johor, Dr Sahruddin Jamal. (2019, April 14). South China Morning 
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the resignation of Datuk Osman Sapian (an ally of Prime Minister 
Mahathir) and the appointment of Dr. Sahruddin Jamal as the new 
Chief Minister. Besides, the interference from the Rulers was also 
evident in a few other administrative matters. For instance it was 
reported that the Sultan of Selangor had an audience with four 
Selangor non-Muslim state executive councilors in August 2019 to 
clear up the issue of a proposed amendment to a state enactment on 
the religious conversion of minors.67
The Monarch’s interference in the making of international treaties 
was evident following the Government’s accession to the Rome 
Statute. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was upon request to present 
before the YDPA, Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri’ayatuddin Al-Mustafa 
Billah Shah ibni Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al-Musta’in Billah, at the 
Istana Negara on 12 March 2019 to update His Majesty the King 
on Malaysia’s participation in the Rome Statute.68 Following the 
meeting, the YDPA advised the Minister to clarify to the public on 
certain points concerning the decision to accede to the Rome Statute. 
They include:69
the chronology of events leading to Malaysia’s accession to (i) 
the Rome Statute;
the benefits to the country for participating in the Rome (ii) 
Statute;
Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
asia/article/3006102/malaysia-swears-new-chief-minister-state-johor-
dr; Mahathir v Johor royals: timeline of recent spat. (2019, May 3). 
The Straits Times. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/
se-asia/mahathir-v-johor-royals-timeline-of-recent-spat. 
67 Muthiah, W. (2019, August 8). Four non-Muslim S’gor exco members 
meet sultan to voice concerns over conversion bill. The Star Online. 
Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/08/08/
four-non-muslim-s039gor-exco-members-meet-sultan-to-voice-
concerns-over-conversion-bill; Selangor non-Muslim exco members 
attend audience with sultan. (2019, August 8). The Sun Daily. Retrieved 
from https://www.thesundaily.my/local/selangor-non-muslim-exco-
members-attend-audience-with-sultan-HC1235229; Ruzki, R. M. and 
Arshad, N. (2019, August 11). 4 exco menghadap Sultan Selangor. 
BH Online. Retrieved from https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/
nasional/2019/08/594025/4-exco-menghadap-sultan-selangor. 
68 Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia. (2019, March 13).
69  Ibid.
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the status and immunities of the YDPA under the Rome (iii) 
Statute; and
the requirement for consulting the COR before the Government (iv) 
decides to accede to the Rome Statute. 
The fact that such an issue drew the interest of the YDPA, and that 
His Majesty, the King offered his viewpoints on how to address 
the matter to the public, signalled that the YDPA may still exercise 
influence in the making of (or the aftermath of the signing) of 
international treaties.
Based on the cases highlighted, there is a strong probability that 
the YDPA and the Malay Rulers could be ‘called’ to interfere in the 
making of international treaties, especially when the treaties (e.g. 
ICERD) encroach on the rights of the Malays, the bumiputeras and 
the religion of Islam. In particular, the YDPA and the Rulers assume 
crucial roles in the country’s administration, especially as they are 
the protector of the religion, the preserver of the nation and the 
symbol of unity. Such interference may not necessarily take place 
during the early stage of the signing of an international treaty, rather 
they may be made after the treaty is signed, which has been proven 
to be effective as illustrated in the accession to the Rome Statute. 
Since the YDPA and the Rulers assume the highest-ranked position 
in the country, it would be unacceptable to see how their viewpoints 
and opinions be dismissed or not given due consideration. Can the 
YDPA ask the Government not to sign or conclude a treaty for the 
betterment of the country? Alternatively, can the YDPA influence 
the Government to withdraw from a particular treaty?
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